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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ALAN CRAIG ABBOTT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890464-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of burglary, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-2(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Has defendant properly preserved and raised on 
appeal the issue of the admissibility of defendant's prior bad 
acts? 
2. Did the trial court clearly abuse its discretion in 
ruling, pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 404(b) that prior bad acts of 
defendant were admissible in the state's case in chief for proof 
of intent as an element of the crime of burglary? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes and rules of evidence for a 
determination of this case are: 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202: 
Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of a 
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully 
in a building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third 
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling 
in which event it is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 404: 
(a) Character evidence generally. 
Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of his character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of his character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character of the victim of 
the crime offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of 
a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a 
homicide case to rebut the evidence that the 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of 
the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimesf wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 609: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from his 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless oE the 
punishment, 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction 
under this rule is not admissible if a period 
of more than ten years has elapsed since the 
date of the conviction or of the release of 
the witness from the confinement imposed for 
that conviction, whichever is the later date, 
unless the court determines, in the interests 
of justice, that the probative value of the 
conviction supported by specific facts and 
circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. However, admissible of a 
conviction more than ten years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless 
the proponent gives to the adverse party 
sufficient advance written notice of intent 
to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the 
use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulmentf or 
certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a 
conviction is not admissible under this rule 
it (1) the conviction has been the subject of 
a pardon, annulment, certificate of 
rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure 
based on a finding of the rehabilitation of 
the person convicted, and that person had not 
been convicted of a subsequent crime which 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has 
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or 
other equivalent procedure based on a finding 
of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of 
juvenile adjudications is generally not 
admissible under this rule. The court may, 
however, in a criminal case allow evidence of 
a juvenile adjudication of a witness other 
than the accused if conviction of the offense 
would be admissible to attack the credibility 
of an adult and the court is satisfied that 
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair 
determination of the issue of guilt or 
innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of 
an appeal therefrom does not render evidence 
of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of 
the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Alan Craig Abbott, was charged by 
information with burglary of a non-dwelLing, a third degree 
felony (R. 7). A jury trial was held on May 10th and 11th, 1989, 
the Honorable Rodney S. Page, Judge, Second Judicial District 
Court, presiding (R. 63-5). The jury returned a verdict of 
guilty as charged (R. 62). Defendant waived time for sentencing 
and was sentenced on May 11, 1989, to the Utah State Prison for 
the statutory indeterminate term of five years to life (R. 67). 
The sentence is to run concurrently with defendant's prior 
commitment for a parole violation (R. 67; T. 26-28). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 23, 1989, Dr. Leroy Taylor, a physician, 
was working late at his office at 425 Medical Drive, Bountiful, 
Utah (T. 11, 18). There are twenty to thirty offices in the two-
story building and four entry-exit doors into the building (T. 
35-36). Dr. Taylor's office is on the second floor (T. 36). On 
the main floor, the entry-exit doors are on the west, south and 
east sides of the building with the main entrance being on the 
west side (T. 13, 36). On the second floor, there is an entry-
exit sliding door which leads directly to the second level of the 
parking lot (T. 36). Normally, the building is opened at 7:00 
a.m. by the janitor and locked at 7:00 p.m. by the night cleaners 
(T. 15-16, 97). However, each tenant has a key to the building 
and may enter at off-hours (T. 80-81). 
Dr. Taylor had been home the night of February 23rd but 
returned to the building around 1:30 a.m. (T. 18-19). When he 
arrived, the only lights on in the building were those in the 
lobby-pharmacy area near the main entrance, in the common 
hallways and in the office directly below Dr. Taylor's (T. 27, 
39). Dr. Christian has the office below Dr. Taylor's and 
normally leaves a light on in the office every night whether he 
is there or not (T. 38-9). Only one other vehicle was in the 
parking lot; it belonged to another doctor who was not in the 
building at the time (T. 39, 53). No other tenants were in the 
building (T. 18, 55). Dr. Taylor entered the building through 
the east doors on the second floor, using his key to unlock and 
then re-lock the door (T. 19). He then entered his own office, 
using a different key (T. 16, 19). Dr. Taylor remained working 
in his office for approximately thirty minutes (T. 20). 
Dr. Taylor exited his office at approximately 2:00 a.m. 
(T. 20). As he turned in the hallway, he immediately saw 
defendant standing in the hall with his back towards the east 
entry-exit doors (T. 20). Defendant was just starting to move 
west away from the outside doors. Defendant and Dr. Taylor were 
within three to five feet of each other (T. 20). Dr. Taylor did 
not know defendant and asked if he could help him (T. 21). 
Defendant responded that he was looking for the bathroom (T. 21). 
Dr. Taylor asked defendant if he had a key to get into the 
building; defendant responded "yes" and held up some keys (T. 22-
23). By this point, defendant was moving away from Dr. Taylor, 
down the stairs leading to the first floor and the main entrance 
(T. 23). Defendant was approximately twelve to fifteen feet 
away from the doctor who could not see anything specific about 
the keys, other than it was a ring of keys (T. 23, 25-6). Dr. 
Taylor continued to question defendant as defendant walked 
rapidly away (T. 25). Dr. Taylor asked defendant to identify 
himself; defendant responded with a made-up name, claiming he was 
associated with an intern (T. 24-5, 185). Dr. Taylor asked: 
"In this building?" And [defendant] said 
'yes, three to four years' and I said 'not in 
this building. There is no o:ie here by that 
name.' And I said 'I need some 
identification.' And I said 'I need some 
identification." (sic) And he looked up and 
said, "Who are you?' and I said, 'Dr. 
Taylor.' I told him I needed some 
identification. We have some dollars in this 
building and we need some ID or I will call 
the police. 
(T. 25). Defendant continued down to the first floor and did not 
respond (T. 25). Dr. Taylor began to call the police but then 
decided to follow defendant instead. He went to his car and 
drove around the building, trying to find defendant. He did not 
see anyone (T. 26). 
Dr. Taylor then returned to his office and called the 
police (T. 28). Approximately five to ten minutes had elapsed 
from the initial encounter (T. 30). The police arrived within 
three to five minutes, and checked the outside perimeter of the 
building (T. 30, 46-7). The police found all four entry-exit 
doors to be locked; however, the main entrance door on the first 
floor could be unlocked from the inside by turning the handle (T. 
49, 51). There were no signs of forced entry into the building 
(T. 56). The police proceeded to check the interior office 
doors, all were locked except for one on the second floor. That 
door was ajar, but nothing was disturbed in the office (T. 49). 
The open office was directly west of Dr. Taylor's on the opposite 
side of the hallway (T. 54-55). 
Neither the police nor Dr. Taylor saw anyone leaving or 
near the building (T. 31, 55). 
Based on Dr. Taylor's description and subsequent 
identification, the police interviewed defendant the next day. 
Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and 
voluntarily waived them (T. 61). The police informed defendant 
that they were investigating a burglary in which defendant had 
been identified as the suspect (T. 62). Initially, defendant 
denied being at the medical building, but when told that Dr. 
Taylor had identified him, defendant responded that nothing had 
been taken (T. 62). Defendant then told the police that he was 
working for First Continental Communications Company (FCCI), a 
private telephone company and had gone to the building to install 
a telephone (T. 63, 72, 116-18). He claimed that he had made 
arrangements with someone in the building but could not recall 
the name of the person he had contacted (T. 63). Defendant told 
the police that he was looking for a location near the exits of 
the building (T. 63). Defendant stated that he had entered the 
building through the main entrance, which he claimed was unlocked 
(T. 64). When the police asked defendant why he had entered the 
building at such a late hour, defendant responded that: 
[H]e had gone to an auction in Salt lake. 
That after the auction was coicluded that he 
got a bite to eat, that he then came back out 
toward his home and stopped off in Bountiful 
at the Medical Center for this reason to look 
for another location for a phone in this 
particular building. 
(T. 65). But, when the police drove defendant to Salt Lake City 
so that he could show them the location of the auction, defendant 
could not identify the building or locate its whereabouts (T. 
77) . 
Further, the manager of the medical building testified 
that he never discussed the installatioi of a telephone with 
either defendant or FCCI and did not authorize defendant to be in 
the building at anytime (T. 85, 87-8). The defendant was never 
authorized to have a key to the building (T. 30). Another tenant 
of the building, Greg Skedros, who had been authorized by the 
manager to arrange for the installation of new telephones in the 
building (T. 86-7), also testified that he had never had any 
contact with defendant or his company nor had ever authorized 
defendant to be in the building (T. 91-5). 
Three other witnesses, including the night cleaners who 
had checked the outside doors of the medical building on February 
23rd, all testified that all four exit-entry doors were locked 
the night in question (T. 96, 102, 105). 
Ann Glasgow, the operations manager of FCCI, testified 
that defendant did work as an independent contractor for the 
private telephone company. Defendant was responsible for finding 
new telephone locations and would receive one hundred dollars 
($100.00) per approved telephone contract (T. 118). Defendant 
began working for the company in September, 1988 (T. 118). He 
earned in commissions $900.00 in September, nothing in October 
and November, $1900.00 in December of 1988 and nothing in January 
or February of 1990 (T. 119). Two hundred dollars ($200.00) of 
the December monies were paid in February (T. 126-7). None of 
the telephone contracts involved installations of telephones in 
medical facilities, most were shopping mall locations (T. 122). 
Defendant telephoned Ann Glasgow shortly after he was 
arrested (T. 122). He told her that he was in the Davis County 
Jail. He said he had been doing a location survey at the medical 
building and was approached by the police for being on the 
premises (T. 122). He claimed that the police stopped him at the 
front entrance to the medical building but that he was not in the 
building itself as the doors were locked (T. 122, 124-25). 
After the admission of the above evidence, during the 
State's case-in-chief, the State moved for the admission to 
defendant's prior burglary convictions, as well as admission of 
dismissed burglary charges admitted to by defendant (T. 128). 
The State contended that such evidence should be admitted 
pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 404(b) to show intent, lack of mistake 
and accident (T. 146-7). Defendant objected on Utah R. Evid. 609 
grounds, claiming that the evidence was otherwise "immaterial" 
(T. 146, 147-8). An evidentiary hearing was held (T. 129-146). 
The court applied that balancing test of Utah R. Evid. 403 and 
determined that the evidence's probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect (T. 149-50). 
The court ruled that the evidence was admissible under Rule 
404(b) but reserved its ruling on Rule 509 grounds until it was 
determined if defendant would take the stand (T. 148-151). The 
court stated that the jury would be specifically instructed as to 
the purpose of the evidence (T. 151). 
Based on the court's ruling, Detective Jim Glover, Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office, testified that he interviewed 
defendant on May 6, 1985. As a result, defendant plead guilty 
The is no dispute that defendant's 1985 statements to the 
police were voluntarily and knowingly made. Nor, is there any 
dispute as to the accurateness of their factual contents (T. 129-
146). Additionally, the parties agreed that defendant went to 
prison on July 12, 1985 and was released to a half-way house on 
parole on October 6, 1987 (T. 153-54). 
to three burglaries and acknowledged involvement in others (T. 
2 
156-57). Defendant told Detective Glover that: 
At 225 South on 2d East, the Hotel 
Development, a building was entered through a 
rear-door and a box of keys was found on a 
desk, on the third floor. Using those keys 
he went through every office except No. 230, 
in the Hotel Development Corp. He took a 
$100 bill and $20 bill. 
. . . 
He went into the Greystone complex using keys 
that he had obtained from another burglary 
and went through three offices. He got about 
$30. 
(T. 157). On cross-examination, defendant's attorney expanded by 
eliciting that defendant had cooperated fully with the police in 
clearing up thirty burglaries (T. 159, 161). Additionally, his 
attorney brought forth that at least one of the burglaries, one 
he plead to, involved the taking of $1750.00 in cash, while 
another, not testified to in the direct examination, involved the 
theft of $1000.00 (T. 159-60). 
The court immediately instructed the jury as to the 
restricted purpose for the admission of the prior bad acts (T. 
161-62); and, the State rested (T. 162). 
Defendant's wife testified on defendant's behalf as to 
their poor financial condition in 1985, when defendant had 
admittedly been involved in numerous burglaries, and their 
improved financial condition in February, 1989 (T. 164-66). She 
admitted that at the time of this charge, defendant had not been 
The jury was not informed-by the State that defendant admitted 
involvement in thirty burglaries. That evidence was presented to 
the trial judge in determining the admissibilty of the evidence. 
The court instructed the State that they would be limited to 
introducing the three convictions plus three dismissed charges 
(T. 132-142, 151). 
working, even though still associated with the private telephone 
company (T. 167). Another defense witness, David Beacco, stated 
that he had been with defendant in December and early January on 
several occasions when defendant was attempting to locate new 
telephone locations (T. 169-70). Defendant told Beacco that he 
was considering a medical building in Bountiful, which he was 
"trying to get to it, but hadn't" (T. 170). However, Beacco 
never went with defendant into the medical building on any 
occasion; nor, ever entered any business with defendant except 
when the business was open in the daytijxie or early evening hours 
(T. 171-72). 
Defendant took the stand. During his direct 
examination, his attorney further questioned defendant about the 
circumstances surrounding his prior burglaries (T. 190). 
Defendant volunteered that he was still on parole at the time of 
this incident (T. 187, 205) and in response to a direct question 
of his attorney, told the jury that he had been committed to the 
Utah State Prison for the prior burglaries, serving 27 months in 
prison and 8 months in the halfway house (T. 187, 191). The 
prosecutor did not refer to the defendant's prior record in his 
cross-examination of defendant and did not question him 
concerning his financial situation other than in 1989 (T. 193-
210). 
Defendant claimed that during the early evening hours 
of February 23, he had been in Salt Lake City conducting 
business. He stated that he went to an auction clearing house 
but no one was there. (T. 174-77). Sometime after midnight, he 
stopped at the Lake View Hospital, across the street from Dr. 
Taylor's medical building, to conduct a telephone survey (T. 178-
79). After half-an-hour to an hour, defendant went to the 
medical building. He had been there one time previously on 
February 14, 1989 to survey the telephones (T. 180). He parked 
near the main entrance (T. 182-83). The front door area was 
illuminated. He did not know what other lights, if any, were on 
in the building (T. 183). He walked to the front door, pulled on 
it and it opened. He walked in (T. 183). He observed 
immediately that a new telephone had been installed from the last 
time he was in the building (T. 183-84). He was "curious" to see 
if a second telephone had been installed on the second floor (T. 
184). When he got to the top of the stairs, he saw Dr. Taylor. 
Defendant did not dispute the gist of Dr. Taylor's description of 
the ensuing conversation. (T. 184). He admitted he had lied 
about his identity to the doctor and left quickly when confronted 
by Dr. Taylor because he knew he should not be in the building 
(T. 185-87). He denied telling the doctor that he had a key to 
the building but admitted that he held up his hand with the keys 
in response to the doctor's question of how he had gotten into 
the building (T. 185-86, 196-97). He admitted that he did not 
tell the doctor that he worked for a telephone company or was 
looking for a place to install a telephone (T. 197). Defendant 
stated he just wanted to end the conversation quickly (T. 198). 
Defendant further admitted that he never told Mrs. 
Glasgow that he was in the building (T. 208). He verified that 
he had not worked from December 28, 1987 to February 2, 1988 (T. 
203). He maintained that the only other time that he had been in 
the medical building was February 14, and specifically denied 
that he had been there on February 18 (T. 206-8). 
In rebuttal, the State called the fourteen year old son 
of the nighttime cleaners of the medical building (T. 214). He 
stated that on February 18, after the building was locked, he was 
cleaning a second floor office when he heard keys and turned 
around to see defendant enter the office (T. 216-18, 219). 
Defendant did not say anything, but tuned around upon seeing the 
cleaners and walked out (T. 218). 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of 
third degree burglary (R. 63). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
During the evidentiary hearing below on the State's 
motion to admit the prior bad acts of defendant in its case in 
chief, defendant only objected to the admission of such evidence 
on Utah R. Evid. 609 grounds, stating the evidence was otherwise 
"immaterial". However, both the State, in making the motion, and 
the court, in ruling, considered the admission of the evidence 
under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) and 403, for purposes of proof of 
intent, lack of mistake or accident. As such, defendant failed 
to make proper objection to the admission of the evidence during 
the State's case in chief, as opposed to its use for impeachment 
or credibility purposes. 
Further, on appeal, defendant has not objected to the 
admission of the evidence on Rule 404(b) grounds, the basis under 
which the court admitted it. As at trial, defendant is relying 
exclusively on Rule 609 grounds, grounds inapplicable to its 
admission in the State's case in chief. Defendant has therefore 
waived on appeal any objection to the admission of the evidence 
under Rule 404(b), 
Should this Court consider the substantive issue, the 
trial court applied the proper test in weighing the admission of 
the evidence under Rule 403. Unless this Court views the trial 
court as clearly abusing its discretion, deference should be 
given to the trial court's ruling on the evidentiary matter. If 
this Court views the admission as error, any prejudicial effect 
was enhanced and compounded by defendant in eliciting greater 
detail concerning the prior bad acts then allowed by the court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO MAKE A PROPER 
CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD ACTS IN THE 
STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF; AND, HAS FAILED TO 
PROPERLY RAISE THE ISSUE ON APPEAL SUCH THAT 
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED ANY 
OBJECTION. 
The Utah appellate courts have consistently required a 
party objecting to the admission of evidence to make a timely and 
specific objection for the question of the admissibility of the 
evidence to be considered on appeal. State v. McCardell, 652 
P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982); State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 
1983). As stated most recently: 
As a general rule, a timely and specific 
objection must be made in order to preserve 
an issue for appeal. . . . Absent a timely 
objection, [the appellate court] will review 
an alleged error only if it is obvious and 
harmful, i.e., only if it constitutes 'plain 
error'. 
State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989)- Accord, 
State v. Gotschall, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 50, 52-53 (1989); State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied 110 S.Ct. 62 
(1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a). 
Here, pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 404(b), the State moved 
in its case in chief for the admission of evidence of prior bad 
acts of defendant to prove intent, lack of mistake or accident 
(T. 128, 146-7). The State proceeded, out of the presence of the 
jury, to put on evidence specifically setting forth the prior bad 
acts which consisted of prior burglary convictions as well as 
dismissed burglaries to which defendant admitted his involvement 
(T. 129- 146). Defendant objected by stating: 
MR. HATCH: I don't have any further 
questions. I object to the three offered 
exhibits [certified copies of defendant's 
convictions] on the basis that they are 
admissable should I include the past records 
as admissible. Should I choose to put him on 
the stand and I think the State limits the 
basis, you can ask him how - ly felonies he's 
been acquitted of, if he says yes they can 
ask him what. It goes to credibility only 
and these other admissions have been 
dismissed that are in jeopardy now are 
entitled immaterial. 
(T. 146). The State responded that while they would like to 
"preserve the option of impeachment in the event that the 
defendant does take the stand," the basis of the current motion 
to admit was premised on Utah R. Evid. 404 to show intent (T. 
146-7). Defendant responded that any prior history was limited 
to impeachment (T. 147-8). 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously viewed a general 
objection as insufficient. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Equally, the Court has held that an objection to 
evidence on grounds other than that on which it was admitted does 
not preserve review of the issue on appeal. State v. Eldredge, 
773 P.2d 29, 35; State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947. 
In defendant's case, the basis of the admission was 
clearly under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) and 403 (T. 149-151). Indeed, 
since the evidence was admitted in the State's case in chief, the 
evidence could have only been admitted "at this portion in the 
trial" (T. 151), as noted by the trial court, for proof of some 
elemental aspect such as intent. The trial court's cautionary 
instruction given to the jury when the evidence was presented 
makes clear the basis of the admission (T. 161-62). 
Credibility and impeachment under Rule 609 were future 
issues to be determined in the defense case if the defendant 
testified. For this reason, the trial court, while expressing an 
initial opinion on the admissibility of the prior convictions for 
credibility, recognized that a balancing test would still finally 
determine their admissibility even if defendant testified (T. 
148-90). For that reason, the court reserved making a final 
ruling on Rule 609 grounds depending on whether or not defendant 
chose to testify (T. 151). When defendant did testify, no 
further objection was made to the evidence. Nor, did the State 
attempt to cross-examine defendant concerning his prior record 
(T. 173-208). Instead, defendant, both by volunteering the 
information and through questioning of his attorney, presented 
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additional details of the prior bad acts (T. 164-66; 187, 190-91, 
205) . 
Further, on appeal, defendant has not raised any issue 
as to the admissibility of the evidence on Rule 404(b) grounds 
but has limited his brief to a discussion of Rule 609. Since the 
court only admitted the evidence under Rule 404(b), defendant 
should be deemed to have waived any objection. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS ON EVIDENTIARY 
MATTERS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS IT IS SHOWN 
THAT THE COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION. 
A trial court's rulings on evidentiary matters must be 
upheld unless it is "manifest that the trial court so abused its 
discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted," 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1937). Accord, State 
v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Banner, 
717 P.2d 1325, 1335 (Utah 1986). An evidentiary ruling as to the 
admission of evidence, under Utah R. Evid. 403, will likewise 
only be reversed for abuse of discretion where the admission of 
the evidence constituted harmful error. State v. Dibello, 780 
P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989); State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 
(Utah 1989). But, erroneous admission of evidence will be deemed 
harmless where there is "convincing, properly admitted evidence 
of all essential elements of the case," State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 
646, 656 (Utah 1989). 
As properly noted by the trial court in this case, the 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, such that evidence 
of prior acts is admissible if relevant to prove an element of 
the crime; unless under Utah R. Evid. 403, the evidence's 
probative value is "substantially outweighed" by its prejudicial 
effect (T. 148). State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 1989); 
Boyce, Utah Rules of Evidence, 85 Utah L. Rev. 63, 84 (1985). 
But, the State recognizes, that within the general rule, the Utah 
appellate courts have scrutinized Rule 404 admissions for their 
potential prejudicial effect. State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 456-
57 (Utah 1989) and cases cited therein; State v. Featherson, 118 
Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1989), State v. Johnson, 115 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 6 (Utah 1989); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 
1988); State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1309 (Utah 1986). 
Here, an evidentiary hearing was held which presented 
in detail the evidence of prior bad acts the State wished to 
admit. The hearing took place during the State's case in chief 
but at the conclusion of the presentation of the other evidence 
the State presented. The trial court had, therefore, a full 
factual basis as to the acts themselves and their probative value 
in regards to proof of defendant's intent while in the building 
after hours. In considering their admission, the court applied 
the proper legal standard. As such, this Court should generally 
defer to the trial court's ruling. 
However, the State recognizes that a close question of 
admissibility is presented in this case. Should this Court 
consider the trial court to have erred in admitting the prior bad 
acts, a determination must still be made as to whether the error 
is harmless. In State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656, the Utah 
Supreme Court, despite the State's position that the erroneous 
admission was prejudicial, found that any error was harmless 
where there was sufficient properly admitted evidence to convict 
defendant. Accord, State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966; State v. 
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah 1988)- Other courts have 
viewed cautionary instructions, as given here, as curative of any 
prejudice. United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
Additionally, assuming arguendo that the trial court 
committed error in admitting the evidence, the degree of harm 
determined by this Court must be tempered by consideration of the 
additional details of defendant's prior bad acts introduced by 
defendant himself. As stated numerous times, a defendant cannot 
invite or compound error and then complain on appeal. State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116; State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26 (Utah 1989); 
United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112, 121 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 981 (1973). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
conviction should be affirmed. 
DATED this <S&~) day of January, 1990. 
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